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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FAIR TRADE LAW RULED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Appellants were enjoined by the lower courts from selling Prestone
anti-freeze at less than the minimum price stipulated by the manufacturer
in an agreement with another distributor.1 The question before the Court
concerned the so-called "nonsigner" clause of the Ohio Fair Trade Act.?
Should a statute be permitted to stand which provides that a minimum
resale price agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor binds
all other distributors of the commodity, whether or not they are parties
to the contract?
Following almost nationwide enactment of fair trade laws3 came Old
Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp.,4 in which the
United States Supreme Court provided the authority and classic reasoning
invariably utilized thereafter by state courts to -buttress decisions uphold-
ing "nonsigner" provisions in fair trade laws. The good will in a trade-
marked commodity is valuable property owned -by the producer.3 The
primary purpose of fair trade laws is to protect the manufacturer's prop-
erty right, price restriction serving as appropriate means to that end.8
Because the distributor does not own the good will, it follows that pre-
venting its destruction by prohibiting resale below established prices can-
not constitute denial of due process on arbitrary grounds. Nor do fair
trade laws deny equal protection, because the legislative classification
bears substantial relation to the object of the legislation 7 If a purchaser
wishes to resell at a price of his own choosing, there is nothing to pre-
vent his removing the trademark from the commodity. Furthermore,
"evidence is voluminous" to the effect that price-cutting is injurious to
the public.8
'Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio St. 182, 147
N.E.2d 481 (1958).
OHIO REv. CODE § 1333.07. "Whoever knowingly and wilfully ... offers for
sale, or sells any commodity at less than the minimum price stipulated in any con-
tract entered into under § 1333.06 ... whether said person ... selling such com-
modity is or is not a party to such contract, is engaging in unfair competition and
unfair trade practices and is liable to any person damaged thereby." § 1333.08 pro-
vides that suit may be brought for injunction against such practice.
'Dr. G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegman Bros., 231 La. 51, 90 So.2d 343
(1956).
'299 U.S. 183 (1936).
'Id. at 195.
'Id. at 193.
7Id. at 195.
oId. at 197.
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Armed with the Old Dearborn case, the courts continued to stave off
attacks upon the constitutionality of fair trade laws until a series of ad-
verse decisions, beginning in 1952, heralded a re-evaluation. Reversal
of the trend found those courts which hold against "nonsigner" clauses
pursuing a universal pattern of reasoning. Public welfare is not so ap-
preciably affected as to justify exercise of the police power to deprive
retailers and distributors of freedom to dispose of their property. At
least one court has asserted that protection is, if anything, injurious to
the public welfare, in that it restricts competition and benefits a few
manufacturers at the expense of the public welfare.10 The concept of
good will as a "property right," entitled to protection in the area of fair
trade, has suffered harsh criticism." Furthermore, it is in violation of
the due process clause of state constitutions to render the distributor's
right to dispose of his property subordinate to the producer's good will.12
Other courts have assaulted "nonsigner" clauses on the ground that they
constitute delegation of legislative power to private persons.' 3
In deciding fair trade cases, nearly all courts appear to recognize two
mutually exclusive property rights: the interest of the producer in the
good will, developed at great expense and symbolized by the trademark
on his product; and the right of the distributor to dispose of his prop-
erty. The final determinant as to which shall prevail lies in a searching
appraisal of the impact which denial of the former and recognition of
the latter would have upon the economy.
Without indicating that it had undertaken such an appraisal, the
Supreme Court of Ohio announced that the "nonsigner" clause bears no
substantial relation to the public welfare, and consequently is an unau-
thorized exercise of the police power.14 The Court further held that the
'See note 3, supra. Between 1952 and 1956, fair trade laws were held unconstitu-
tional in 12 states; during the same period constitutionality of such laws was upheld
by 9 states. In 1957, New Mexico also declared its fair trade laws to be unconstitu-
tional. Skaggs Drug Center v. General Electric Co., 315 P.2d 967 (N.M. 1957).
"Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 139 (1956);
Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. White River Distributors, 224 Ark. 558, 275
S.W.2d 455 (1955).
'The function of the trade name is simply to designate the manufacturer of the
commodity. Shakespeare v. Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 268
(1952). Chafee questions the applicability of the doctrine of equitable servitudes
to commodities. Note, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945,
1013 (1928). Thus relief against trademark infringement is based more upon
protection against tortious interference with trade expectancies than exclusive own-
ership of the good will as an object of property. Schulman, Fair Trade Acts and the
Law of Restrictive Agreements Affecting Chattels, 49 YALE L.J. 607 (1940).
"Cox v. General Electric Co., 211 Ga. 286, 85 S.E.2d 514 (1955).
'See note 3, supra at 64, 90 S.2d at 347.
"See note 1, supra at 184. The Court chose not to comment upon the accuracy of
a determinative conclusion of the Court of Appeals:
September
